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General Points
There is equal justification for carrying out
independent evaluations of educational research
projects (ERP) and for self-evaluations undertaken by
persons who have led and/or participated in projects.
The latter is bound to be subjective but this
subjectiveness is also the reason why a self-evaluation
is able to assess which factors have had greater weight
and have been more crucial in influencing the progress
of an ERP. In fact, both types of evaluations can be
helpful in identifying bottlenecks.
The present note is of the latter type. It concerns a
research programme on human resources between the
Netherlands and Colombia. After a chronological
account, we comment on the objectives and
background of the research programme and discuss
questions involving the relationships between sponsors,
coordinators, the research team and users. By
choosing to discuss the interactions between the
actors, this case study highlights the advantages of
looking at an ERP as an evolving process between
persons with prescribed roles.1
Chronological Account
As is well known, bilateral technical assistance (BTA)
from the Netherlands (or from other donors) to
Colombia (or other recipients) is allocated on a yearly
basis. In several rounds of negotiations the Colombian
authorities (Ministry of Planning) allocate specific
projects (sponsored by various departments in
Colombia) to particular donors and thereby define the
BTA of each donor. This little studied diplomatic
process has produced a Dutch/Colombian allocation
cr a research programme on education and training
of almost US$1 mn to be paid by the Dutch (1977), and
a Colombian contribution which ranges between
US$1 and US$1.5mn (1979-82). The project is the
subject of this case study.
This approach is discussed at greater length in the paper by S. L
Cohen and H. Reiff in this issue.
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Surely factors other than diplomatic processes played
a role in this engagement. Probably the Dutch policy
in the mid and late seventies, of relating assistance to
target groups, and awareness on the part of the
Colombian negotiators and their informants of the
existence of Dutch expertise in the area of education
and manpower (for example, J. Tinbergen) did have
some influence.
In any case, the Dutch Department of Development
Cooperation turned to Dutch expertise (the writer of
this note, who later became the designer and
coordinator of the project). After the usual
negotiations on what to study, who should be
contracted, at what costs and according to which time
schedule, an agreement was reached in less than a year.
The project started in January 1978. It completed the
methodology phase and some preliminary collection
of data in haIfa year, by July 1978. The progress was
evaluated by both authorities in September 1978.
Implementation took more time than was planned but
did not exceed the funds allocated. The project was in
the end extended twice with some extra finance. The
production of a large number of internal reports was
followed by an all-encompassing project report, in
early 1982. An international symposium on the theme
of employment and education was convened in April
1982, which celebrated the official completion of the
collaborative research.2
Objectives and Background
The main objective of the research programme was to
identify the conditions under which a more effective
planning and execution of manpower training could
take place in SENA (National Apprenticeship Service)
and in Colombia as a whole.
As background to the project, it may be mentioned
that SENA has been the core of manpower training in
2 The final report was edited by the two project coordinators. S. 1.
Cohen and A. Sarmiento (Sistema de Planeacion de Recursos
Humanos, SENA. Bogota, 1952).
Colombia since 1957. It is responsible for the
organisation in centres and enterprises of instruction
courses and upgrading programmes for workers in
almost all econ.omic activities. More recently SENA
has expanded into mobile training programmes and
community development activities. It draws its
resource from a tax of about 2.5 per cent on salaries
and wages; the tax is collected from all public and
private enterprises above a certain size as well as the
central government, territorial departments and
municipalities. SENA is relatively autonomous in the
planning and execution of its activities.
Throughout the period of its existence, SENA has
trained rapidly growing numbers of skilled workers to
high standards. Its record has been impressive and it is
now one of the most effective centres in Latin
America. The abundance of resources and the
autonomy of SENA have led to the emergence of
several needs:
- the need for close links between national
development policy and SENA activities. A training
agency will be able to judge the demand for its services
more accurately when manpower forecasts at the
national level have been improved and a place for
vocational training in a national employment strategy
is formulated. At that time there had been no attempt
at that kind of articulation at the national level;
the need for a system of programming its own
allocations to training activities, as well as regular
machinery for controlling the eventual results of the
programmes, their assessment and feedback.
The project attempted to meet both these needs and
fell, therefore, into two major parts. The first part
applied models and projections, and the second part
relied on tracer and other survey studies. Besides these
two major parts, the research programme contained
an array of specific studies relating to the functioning
of formal and informal labour markets in Colombia.
To help the reader in placing this case study alongside
other ERP, it is worth mentioning some stylised
descriptions. This project was of the policy type, with
heavy elements of institution building. It had a large
team of researchers and assistants, large financial
resources, full access to related government docu-
ments, high prestige - in the sense of promoting
bilateral diplomatic relations between donor and
recipient, an extensive network of users via the 16
regional offices of SENA spread throughout the
country, and frequent exchanges of documents and
advisers with the World Bank, UNESCO and ILO.
The international symposium which discussed the
final results of the research programme was an
important national event politically. The President of
the Republic delivered the opening speech, and the
meeting was intellectually impressive.3 But these
characteristics, which undoubtedly have beneficial
effects, have their costs too, which is in the nature of all
activities.
Sponsors-Coordinators
From the point of view of sponsors and coordinators,
the project had three phases.
First phase The project had two coordinators, one
Dutch and one Colombian. The Dutch coordinator
made a start on his functions in January 1978. On the
Colombian side it was then not yet settled who would
be the de facto Colombian coordinator. This was
understandable. The position of the coordinator a)
allowed its holder to strengthen his position within
SENA at the cost of other candidates; b) entitled him
to contract Colombian experts as members of the
research team, and thereby, increased his network of
relationships; c) might bring about such benefits as
travel in the country and abroad, and d) attracted
prestige.
All these reasons tended to make the race a very vital
one for the competing candidates. What was the
impact? The delay was a godsend, in a sense. It allowed
the Dutch coordinator to go ahead, with the combined
Dutch-Colombian research team and the officials of
SENA, in designing the methodology and laying down
the management framework of the project and work
assignments, which basically endured throughout the
other phases. In short, the first phase was dominated
by the Dutch coordinator, with a marginal role for the
Colombian coordinator. The situation allowed quick
accomplishments regarding design and methodology.
In general, if methodological questions are subjected
to long arguments of a groping nature, as often
happens in contexts which can be described as more
liberal and less experienced, it is very likely that most
of the researchers' time will be wasted in theorising.
The first phase, with strict leadership, avoided such
pitfalls.
Second phase An evaluation by a combined mission
of the progress made directed attention to the
desirability of having a strongly supported Colombian
coordinator. The competition for that position ended
with clear indications as to who was to run the project.
The second phase saw a reversal in the role of the
coordinators. The Dutch coordinator paid regular but
short visits. The Colombian coordinator devoted his
full time to the project. The hired Colombian research
team was extended and included some of the best
Among world renowned in the areas of employment and education
who attended the international symposium were!. Adelman, G. S.
Becker, A. Berry, H. Correa, G. Pschacharopolous, D. Seers, F.
Welch.
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economists in Colombia. They had important links
with the Ministry of Planning and top universities and
research institutions in Colombia. The team was
regularly in the news and in many instances they were
able to deal straightforwardly with the Embassy ofthe
Netherlands. What was the impact? The project took
more time, and eventually more funds, than was
planned or considered necessary. This had been
occasioned by the inability of the coordinator in
charge to enforce demands for output from hired
economists, who occupy a very high status in
Colombian intellectual circles.4 The hired economists
had other commitments as well, with the consequence
that only a minimum of the collected data was utilised
by the project (but we later extracted guarantees that
the unused data will be taken up by SENA in
collaboration with international organisations). The
diplomatic weight of SENA, the coordinator and the
research team were strong enough to extend the
project for a period. Regular extensions have become
almost a convention in Dutch/Colombian
technical cooperation and this project was no
exception. For both sides it is easier to channel more
funds into an established venture than to look for new
outlets, up to a certain point.
Third phase As the time became tighter, the critical
point approached. It became evident that the
emphasis on the hired experts had to give way to work
assignments for four young graduates, as regular
employees of SENA. They had the task of completing
the studies. They were recruited and paid directly by
SENA. The allocation of SENA funds for this purpose
was very difficult but was made possible by the
promotion of the Colombian coordinator to the
position of sub-director of SENA. He kept the
position of Colombian coordinator, which helped the
project to reach a successful end during its last phase.
The role of the Dutch coordinator, which was both
technical and managerial in the first phase, became
more technical and much less managerial in the second
and third phases.
Research Team, Output and Input
The project had at different stages four Dutch experts
and 12 Colombian experts, in addition to 20 regular
assistants from SENA. This project was one ofthe first
experiments in Dutch assistance in Colombia to rely
on contracted Colombian experts. This brought up all
kinds of issues regarding salary scales, foreign
exchange compensation, rights and duties, etc, which
will not be discussed here. Rather we will comment on
issues of output as compared to input.
Some of the hired economists in the research learn had previously
taught the coordinator in charge of the project. A few others were
directing futty-liedged institutes, tiad lists of established pubti-
cations and/or strong links with party politics.
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If the recipient country has well-trained nationals, as is
the case in Colombia, then hiring a Colombian expert
has advantages over hiring a Dutch expert. The
advantages are that the national knows the country,
has no problems of adaptation, and above all, is
cheaper, so that more can be accomplished within the
same budget.
The experience of the project has showed much of the
above to be true, but the potential may not be fully
realised if the hired experts outrank the management.
As is well known, in many countries with a scarcity of
experts, we often find such people engaged in several
jobs at the same time. Effort tends to be fragmented.
The project suffered from this feature. The result is a
high unit cost of realised output, in spite of nominally
cheap rates of national expertise. This does not mean
that, if the project had been more heavily Dutch-
manned, the unit cost of realised output would have
been lower. Far from that. In fact. the value of the
realised contribution of one Dutch expert was also
questïoned.
In summary, effectiveness depends on the particular
persons involved on both sides. To recruit a
professional, devoted, disciplined and harmoniously
functioning team is very much a matter of luck.
Users, Results and Feedback
SENA's wide network saw to it that the research
process was simultaneously relayed to the central and
regional offices. In fact, the medium term plan for the
development of SENA coincided with the research
programme. The two evolved into one integrated
framework. In this way, a high degree of feedback was
assured.
At one time at the start, the Colombian counterparts
showed that they were highly conditioned by a
negative experience with the misuse of copyrights by
North Americans. It was difficult to change this
attitude, even when it became apparent that misuse
was outlawed by the officially signed administrative
accord between the two countries. Of course, other
things remaining the same, it is true that a donor
economist may have more free university time to
elaborate on the field research than the recipient
economist, who has less facility to do so. Such
attitudes continue to survive in situations where
inequalities are imposed on equals. The circumstances
are exogenous to educational research, but can
seriously affect its implementation.
Benefit-Cost Performance
Performance cannot be compared across projects of
different natures. We have described this project in
several terms. The main features are: official bilateral
assistance, political prestige, institutional backing,
expensiveness in terms of unit cost of realised output.
Such a project can be sensibly evaluated against
standards set for this type of educational research. The
problems encountered here are different from those in
academic or dissertation-type research, evaluatory or
incidental projects.
It is to be noted, of course, that the existence of
intergovernmental allocations to educational research
of the kind described above has not been the subject of
judgement here. That is a subject apart.
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